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Abstract. This paper proposes an architecture, called “tower of knowl-
edge”, according to which knowledge may be organised in the form of
layers of nouns, verbs, adjectives and sensors. A scheme of interpret-
ing scenes using the tower of knowledge and aspects of utility theory is
also proposed. The scheme combines concepts of logic approaches with
probability theory to propose a method for object recognition and scene
labelling.
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1 Introduction
Classical pattern recognition methods rely on the use of training examples to
span the feature space and thus identify the boundaries between the classes they
wish to recognise. Thus, they follow the statistical school of thought in relation to
learning. However, it is generally acknowledged that learning implies the ability
to generalise, and this implies the use of a different methodology for learning.
Even neural network based methods, in order to generalise well, rely heavily on
the availability of enough training samples to populate adequately the feature
space. The training patterns are used by the neural networks to approximate
the class boundaries in the feature space with piece-wise linear segments. When
an unknown pattern arrives, it can be associated with the class that has been
identified to populate the part of the feature space where the pattern appears.
Some old [3] and some more recently developed methods [1], that can work
with fewer training patterns than straightforward methods, do so by selecting
the patterns that matter most in defining the class boundaries, rather than by
using some higher level generalisation abilities of the classifier [19]. So, neural
networks and pattern classification methods do not really involve mechanisms for
generalising beyond the examples that already have been encountered. Statistical
learning is slow, as one has to encounter many examples in order to be able to
learn the generic characteristics of classes. It is very likely that humans learn
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this way particularly in early stages of their life. The observed fast learning,
even from single examples, often exhibited by humans, must be happening in
a different way. It may be attributed to the application of rules of logic which
either have already been extracted from the observation of many examples, or
have been taught to the learner by some teacher in a ready to use form.
We may conclude, therefore, that we have true generalisation capabilities,
only when what is learnt by training examples are rules on how to extract the
identity of objects and not the classes of objects directly. If such learning has
taken place, totally unknown objects may be interpreted correctly, even in the
absence of any previously seen examples.
This conclusion implies that what we have to teach the computer, in order
to construct a cognitive system, are relations rather than facts. For example,
memorising the dictionary of a language, does not teach a person the language.
The person has to learn the relations between words in order to master the
language. The relations may be learnt by observing hundreds of examples, i.e.
in a statistical way, or they may be inserted to the computer in the form of
relational rules. This is in agreement with Winstone’s pioneering experiments on
teaching the computer to recognise arches. He did not show to the computer all
possible types of arch it may encounter. He showed it some examples and counter
examples of arches and taught it to recognise relations between components, such
as “supports” or “is supported by” [22].
So, both approaches of learning, namely statistical and logic-based, have
their role to play in a cognitive system, and they may be emulated when trying
to solve problems of recognition in computer vision. An important factor that
influences significantly the reasoning process is the way these rules are stored
and retrieved. It is not easy to disassociate the reasoning process used, from
the way knowledge is stored and information is encoded. This paper presents
a scheme of encoding the rules of logic and probabilistic reasoning in a unified
framework for recognising objects not only on the basis of how they look like,
but also on the basis on what they are used for. Thus, temporal and static
appearance information may be incorporated as well as direct communication
between sensors and components of the reasoning system.
2 Objects as spatio-temporal entities
Objects exist in space and time. Their existence in time is manifested by the way
they are used, i.e. by observed actions involving them. So, when we recognise
some object as being a particular type of object, we utilise not only the knowledge
we acquired about this object by simply seeing static versions of it, but also by
seeing it being used, or even by manipulating it with our hands. We may envisage
the following fragment of conversation between a teacher and a learner:
“What is this?”
“This is a window.”
“Why?”
“Because it lets the light in and allows the people to look out.”
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“How?”
“By having an opening at eye level.”
“Does it really?”
Such an exchange may be thought of as representing the steps of the reasoning
that happens in somebody’s head during the process of object identification. We
shall use it to identify the components of the system architecture we propose for
an artificial cognitive system.
The basic architecture of the proposed system is schematically shown in
figure 1. This figure proposes that knowledge may be represented by a series of
networks, forming a complex structure that I call the “tower of knowledge”. The
network of nouns is a network of object names, labels, e.g. “window”, “chimney”,
“door”, etc. The network of verbs or actions, is a network of functionalities, e.g.
“to look out”, “to enter”, “to exit”, etc. The network of appearances is a network
of basic characteristics necessary for a functionality to be fulfilled, e.g. “it is an
opening of human size at floor level”. So, the flow of knowledge goes like the
fragment of conversation given above. The loop closes when we confirm that the
object we are looking at has the right characteristics for its functional purpose
to be fulfilled. Most classical pattern recognition approaches operate only at the
level of nouns of the tower of knowledge. They use relations only in the form of
relative geometric arrangements of objects, or object co-occurrences in scenes,
in order to capture context, rather than relations that are invoked through joint
purpose, joint use, or joint involvement in actions, as it is advocated here.
Note that the generic logic model of an object is encoded in the inter-layer
connections of the proposed scheme. The generic knowledge of which sensors
are useful for which object or functionality is again implicitly encoded in the
connections that start from the various different descriptors and go back to the
sensors. In such a scheme there is room for involving sensors other than cameras,
for example chemical or pressure sensors, if the characteristic necessary for an
object to fulfil a certain functionality involves input other than optical. For
example, if the label “food” is invoked at the nouns level, and functionality “to
be eaten” is invoked in the verbs level, which in turn invokes the descriptor
“smells good”, an olfactory sensor may be invoked to check whether the object
actually has an acceptable smell for something edible. This example shows that
sensors and measurements invoked by the descriptors level may be different
from those originally observed and fed bottom up to the nouns level to start the
process of labelling. An example which makes such a scheme very clear is the
case when one tries to discriminate between a realistic looking flower and a real
one.
For the tower of knowledge scheme to be implemented in practice, one has
to be able to model its various layers of networks and their inter-connections.
For this purpose, one has various tools at one’s disposal: Markov Random Fields
[8], grammars [17], inference rules [20], Bayesian networks [15], Fuzzy inference
[23], etc. I would exclude from the beginning any deterministic crisp approaches,
either because things are genuinely random in nature (or at least have a sig-
nificant random component), or because our models and our knowledge is far
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too gross and imperfect for creating crisp rules and dogmatic decisions. The
most commonly used classical pattern recognition approaches which incorporate
contextual information (at the level of nouns only) are Markov Random Fields
(MRF) and Bayesian Approaches, in particular Probabilistic Relaxation (PR).
I will examine next these two approaches.
3 Markov Random Fields
Contextual influence within the same level of the tower of knowledge often is
modelled by a classical MRF, represented by an undirected graph. I argue here
that directional MRFs should be used instead, often called belief networks. A
directional (or asymmetric) MRF captures better the mutual influence between
labels. For example, the label “staircase” may trigger the label “door” more fre-
quently than the label “door” triggers the label “staircase”. This asymmetry in
the interactions is a manifestation that Markov Random Fields (MRFs) are not
applicable here in their usual form in which they are applied in image process-
ing. An example of the interactions in a neighbourhood of an MRF, defined on
a grid, is shown in Fig. 2b. This MRF, and the weights it gives for neighbouring
interactions, cannot be expressed by a Gibbs joint probability density function
[5]. For example, the cell at the centre is influenced by its top left neighbour with
weight −1, but itself, being the bottom right neighbour of the cell at the top
left, influences it with weight +1. This asymmetry leads to instability when one
tries to relax such a random field, because local patterns created are not glob-
ally consistent (and therefore not expressible by global Gibbs distributions) [16].
According to Li [9, 10, 11], relaxations of such MRFs do not converge, but oscil-
late between several possible states. (Optimisations of Gibbs distributions either
converge to the right interpretation, but more often than not, they hallucinate,
i.e. they settle on wrong interpretations.)
So, one could model the network at each level of the tower of knowledge shown
in Fig. 1, using a non-Gibbsian MRF, e.g. a belief network [5]. The interdepen-
dencies between layers might also be modelled by such networks, but perhaps it
is more appropriate to use Bayesian models, as the inter-layer dependencies are
causal or diagnostic, rather than peer-to-peer.
4 Bayesian Inference
Bayesian approaches have been used so far in two ways: either in the form of
probabilistic relaxation (PR) [7, 2] or in the form of Pearl-Bayes networks of
inference [15]. Probabilistic relaxation has its origins in the seminal work on
constraint propagation by Waltz [21], who used crisp constraints and solved
once and for all the problem of globally inconsistent labellings that used to
lead to impossible objects [6]. Probabilistic relaxation updates the probabilities
of various labels of individual objects by taking into consideration contextual
information [7]. As this contextual information is in effect peer-to-peer, proba-
bilistic relaxation is not an appropriate tool for modelling causal relationships.
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Fig. 1. The tower of knowledge: how knowledge may be organised. The double-headed
arrows represent contextual interactions. The thin continuous arrows represent queries.
The dashed arrows represent answers, i.e. transfer of information. The level of interest
in a cognitive vision task is the level of nouns, where we wish to assign labels to objects.
Examples of nodes with contextual connotations in the network of nouns are “door”,
“window”, “balcony”. Examples of nodes with contextual connotations in the network
of functionality are “lets air in”, “lets light in”, “allows a person to enter”. Examples
of nodes with contextual connotations in the network of descriptions are “has a glass
pane”, “is at eye-level”, “has a handle to open it”.
It is rather an alternative tool to MRFs discussed in the previous section for
modelling influences at the same layer. Probabilistic relaxation, just like MRF
relaxation, is not guaranteed to converge to a unique global solution, unless spe-
cial conditions are obeyed [18]. This, however, is not an issue in reality: labellings
of scenes do not have to be globally consistent, but only locally consistent. This
statement seems to be in contradiction with the previous statement, saying that
probabilistic relaxation is the generalisation of Waltz’s algorithm which solved
the problem of inconsistent labellings in the 60s. This contradiction, however, is
only superficial. The problem of inconsistent labellings of the 60s was referring
to the labellings of single solid objects, by labelling their sub-parts [4] and not
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the labellings of scenes that contain many different objects, where constraints
between objects are far weaker than constraints within the subparts of the same
solid object.
The second form of Bayesian approach is that of Pearl-Bayes networks of in-
ference. Here the relations may be causal, and so these networks are appropriate
for inter-layer inference. Bayesian approaches depend on conditional probabili-
ties. How to choose these conditional probabilities has always been a problem for
such methods. Conditional probabilities may have to be learnt painfully slowly
from hundreds of examples. Alternatively, conditional probabilities may be trans-
ferred ready from another already trained network: the network of the teacher.
This transference is equivalent to choosing them to have some parametric form
(e.g. Gaussian) with parameters chosen “arbitrarily”. The arbitrary choice of
form and parameters usually leads to the criticism of the approach being ad-hoc
or unjustified. It is not, if the teacher simply transfers their own hard gained
knowledge to the pupil (the computer). Such an approach leads us to new the-
ories, like for example the so called “utility theory” [12].
Utility theory is a decision theory. Assigning labels to objects depicted in
an image is a decision. In the Bayesian framework we make this decision by
maximising the likelihood of a label given all the information we have. In util-
ity theory, this likelihood has to be ameliorated with a function called “utility
function”, that expresses subjective preferences or possible consequences of each
label we may assign. The utility function multiplied with the Bayesian probabil-
ity of each label and summed over all possibilities leads in one pass only to the
final label. So, this approach avoids the iterations used by MRFs and PR. The
utility function may be identified with the innate meta-knowledge somebody
has acquired about the world. It is that knowledge, that might have been learnt
from many examples, but which now is expressed in the form of conditions and
prejudices that cannot be fully justified by the measurements we make. It is the
knowledge that tells us to be cautious when we want to buy a car from a man
that postponed the appointment we made several times, that did not produce
immediately the maintenance record of the car we requested, and so on. Such
ideas have been around for some time, without people using the term “utility
function”. For example, psychologists in the mid-nineties were talking about the
so called p-maps and m-maps. The p-maps were meant to be the prior knowledge
we have about various possible patterns that we may encounter in life. A p-map
guides us to sample a scene more or less carefully at places where it matters
or it does not matter, respectively, producing the m-map that is specific to the
present situation. One may identify here the p-maps as being the utility func-
tions of today and the m-maps the Bayesian part of labels conditioned on the
measurements we have made1.
In the computer vision context, utility theory has been used by Marengoni
[13] to select the features and operators that should be utilised to label aerial
1 The ideas of p-maps and m-maps first came to my knowledge by Robin Shirley of
the Psychology Department of Surrey University, who passed away before he had
the chance to make them more concrete and publish them.
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images. Further, one may interpret the work of Miller et al. [14] as using a utility
function that penalises the unusual transformations that will have to be adopted
to transform what is observed to what the computer thinks it is. The authors
effectively choose labels by maximising the joint likelihood of the probability den-
sity function of the observed transforms and the probability density function of
the labels and observations, assuming that transforms and labels/measurements
are independent.
5 Modelling the “why” and the “how” in order to answer
the “what”
Let us consider the tower of knowledge presented in Fig. 1. We shall formulate
here the problem of learning to recognise objects in a scene, using this hierar-
chical representation of knowledge and utility theory.
Let us assume that we use maximum likelihood to assign labels to a scene.
In the conventional way of doing so, object oi will be assigned label lj with
probability pij , given by:
pij = p(lj |mi)p(mi) = p(mi|lj)p(lj) (1)
where mi represents all the measurements we have made on object oi, and p(mi)
and p(lj) are the prior probabilities of measurements and labels, respectively.
Probabilistic relaxation will update these probabilities according to the con-
textual information received from neighbouring regions. We do not follow that
route here. Instead, we shall use the information coming from the other layers of
knowledge to moderate this formula. Let us identify the units in the verbs level
of Fig. 1 by fk, and the units at the descriptor level of Fig. 1 by dl. Then we
may choose label lji for object oi as follows:
ji = arg max
j
∑
k
ujk
∑
l
vklcil
︸ ︷︷ ︸
utility function(i,j)
pij (2)
where ujk indicates how important is for an object with label lj to fulfil func-
tionality fk; vkl indicates how important characteristic dl is for an object to have
the possibility to fulfil functionality fk, and cik is the confidence we have that
descriptor dl applies to object oi.
Note that the value of the utility function expresses the evidence we have
that region oi has the necessary characteristics to fulfil its role as object lj . For
example, if the label we consider of assigning to object oi is “balcony”, the utility
function must express whether this object has dimensions big enough to allow
a human to stand on it, whether it is attached on a wall, and whether there is
a door leading to it. All these are conditions that will allow an object to play
the role of a balcony. A learning scheme must be able to learn the values of ujk
and vkl either directly from examples (slowly and painfully), or by trusting its
teacher, who having learnt those values himself, slowly and painfully over many
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years of human life experiences, directly inserts them to the computer learner.
The computer learner then must have a tool box of processors of sensory inputs
that will allow it to work out the values of cil.
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Fig. 2. (a) A local neighbourhood at the pixel level with globally consistent Markov
parameters: if this field is relaxed it will lead to horizontal strips of similar labels which
will be distinct from the labels above and below. In image processing it will lead to
a texture pattern with strong horizontal directionality. (b) A local neighbourhood at
the pixel level with globally inconsistent Markov parameters: the top left pixel tells
the central pixel to be different from it; the central pixel, seen as the bottom right
neighbour of the top left pixel, tells it to be similar to it.
6 Conclusions
I presented here a scheme that may be used to recognise objects. It implicitly en-
codes the rules of logic in the form of connections made between objects (nouns),
functionalities (verbs), descriptors (adjectives) and sensors, each represented by
a separate layer of interconnected nodes. Modelling the relations between the
nodes of the same layer may be achieved by using non-Gibbsian Markov random
fields (e.g. directed graph models or belief networks) or probabilistic relaxation,
while transferring information between the different layers may be performed
using a probabilistic approach like Maximum likelihood estimation and utility
theory.
I argued that learning is characterised by the ability to generalise, and that
this can only be achieved if what is learnt is not the labels of the objects viewed,
but the rules according to which these labels are assigned. I have also argued that
this meta-knowledge may be transferred to the learner (the computer) directly
by the teacher (the human developer), in the form of rules, or in the simplest
way, by the human using the parameters of the algorithms according to their
personal experience and intuition. This puts me at odds with the majority of
the community of reviewers who tend to reject papers on the grounds that the
parameters have been chosen ad hoc with no proper explanation: these are the
cases of the teacher transplanting to the learner their painstakingly acquired
knowledge. The alternative is for the learner each time to acquire this knowledge
painfully slowly from thousands of examples.
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I also argued that we do not need globally consistent labellings of scenes.
Global consistency will never allow us to label correctly the scene painted by
Magritte of a train storming out of a fire place, because trains do not come
out from fire places! It will never allow the computer to recognise green horses
with 5 legs, but we, humans, do. So, what we need is fragments of reality and
knowledge. The framework I presented views objects as spatio-temporal entities
and allows the incorporation of information coming from temporal observations
involving them, static images, user prior knowledge and extra sensors to decide
their identity. Being an object-centric scheme, it does not try to find a glob-
ally optimal labelling, and as such it is expected to be able to cope with the
interpretation of bizarre scenes like those mentioned above.
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